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This paper investigates loan loss provisioning (LLP) behaviour by Vietnamese banks during 
the period 2006-2012. We test the capital, income-smoothing and cyclical management 
hypotheses and examine whether the inclusion of X-efficiencies and/or risk control variables 
influences provisioning behaviour. When the X-efficiency estimates are incorporated into the 
models, Vietnamese banks do not exhibit counter-cyclical or capital management 
manipulation by managers, but counter cyclical income smoothing.  Yet, the inclusion of risk 
control variables in x-efficiency scores (either equity or reserves for impaired loans) supports 
the addition of capital management hypotheses.   
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1.  Introduction 
 Given the complex trade-offs between capital, risk, efficiency and ultimately profit 
there are delicate yet important decisions to be made by bank managers as to the past, present 
and future risk appetite of the bank.  These managers are reliant on financial accounting 
metrics to make informed decisions whilst being constrained in their decision-making by 
uncertainty and regulations governing the safety and soundness of these banks (Bushman and 
Williams, 2012).  However, this reliance should not be overstated as the ability to influence 
and align metrics to the strategy of the firm, better known as ‘earnings or capital 
management’, instead of the other way round, is well documented within the existing 
literature (Fonseca and González, 2008). 
 One such metric, Loan Loss Provisions (LLP), acts as a best estimate by the banks’ 
managers as to the expected losses on their loan portfolios i.e., when customers default.  
However, the knock-on effect of this ‘management’ is that any upward movement in 
‘general’ LLP will generally increase Tier 2 capital under the Basel Capital Accord ‘rules’ 
(Basel Committee, 1988), although this will be at the expense of net income and profits as 
tax-deductibility is confined to ‘specific’ LLP.   
 This may give the impression of financial stability and safety to regulators but the 
manipulation of profit and efficiency of the firm requires further investigation.  This is 
particularly interesting in countries where regulatory capital controls are considered less 
exacting, as in Vietnam, as it gives managers more freedom to influence such metrics at a 
time when domestic credit had grown from 35% of GDP in 2001 to 120% by 2010.  
Furthermore, the fundamental lack of a securitisation and CDO market in Vietnam during the 
period under investigation could make such metrics even more important as credit default 
risk is retained on the issuing banks’ balance sheets.  Hence, banks can manipulate their 
equity capital instead of incomes (whether through pro- or counter-cyclical measures or 
income-smoothing) to cover expected losses through X-efficiency improvements in their 
overall business models.   
This study thus provides important clarification on model specification for LLP 
testing in future research studies.  Vietnam provides an interesting and somewhat unique 
arena from which to test these models, not only due to its neglect in previous analysis but also 
due to its rapid evolution over the testable period.  With international regulators and Basel III 
legislation currently focussing on institutional safety and the relationship between LLP and 
losses in an attempt to phase out income-smoothing, it seems rational for future studies to pay 
attention to the results and methodological insights of this current study. 
 
2.   Model and Data 
Since LLP and loan growth change over time and their values at time t are likely to be 
affected by their lagged terms, it is more appropriate to use dynamic panel data analysis than 
a static panel data analysis with fixed/random effects (a recent example of the latter include 
Bushman and Williams, 2012) .  That is, our base-combined model is: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽(𝐿)𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
Where (𝐿)𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the lag polynomial of business cycle, income smoothing, risk management 
and x-efficiency variables, 𝜂𝑖 are individual bank specific effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term and 
where the subscripts 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁  and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇  denote the cross sectional and time 
dimensions of the panel.  However, given the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the 
equation to be estimated, the standard error estimators are inconsistent since the unobserved 
panel-level effects are correlated with the lags of the dependent variables.  By first 
differencing (Δ) equation (1) this eliminates the unobserved bank-specific effects by taking 
the first differences and captures the dynamic nature of the models by allowing for the 
inclusion of lagged dependent variables, equation (2).   
LLP𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 Δ𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽(𝐿)Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
 
This is the common, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (1995, 1998), our model constitutes an 
unbalanced sample of Vietnamese banks over the period 2006 to 2012, hence covering pre 
WTO introduction and pre and post Global Finance Crisis (GFC).  Indeed, our GMM model 
incorporates jointly, business cycle, income smoothing and capital management hypotheses, 
rather than separately estimating these hypotheses in line with Anandarajan et al. (2007) and 
Ghosh (2007).  Our complete specification is therefore: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 + 𝜅2𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡  + 𝜅3𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝜅4𝑇𝐶𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜅5𝑁𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜅6𝐿𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜅7𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜅8𝐶𝐷𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.  
            (3) 
Where, 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = LLP for bank i at time t  
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1  = captures the autoregressive component in the emergence of doubtful loans and 
dynamic adjustment of LLP,  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 = GDP Growth testing for counter or procyclicality 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 = Unemployment Rate testing for counter or procyclicality 
𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = Net income to determine the extent to which  LLP is based solely on the level of 
earnings 
 𝑇𝐶𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =Total common equity testing for Capital Management Hypothesis 
 𝑁𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = Net off balance sheet income,  
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = Total assets, used to scale bank specific variables, In addition, we also include specific 
risk factors to account for any potential feedback through the management process of 
Vietnamese banks,  
𝐿𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡   = liquid assets to total deposits, 
𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 =total loans to total deposits  
𝐶𝐷𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 = customer deposits to total funding less derivatives. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  a standard i.i.d error.  For the summary statistics see Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Dynamic Loan Loss Provisioning Model - Summary Statistics 
 Mean Minimum Maximum St. Dev 
LLPTA 0.3913 -0.4846 1.9238 0.3907 
GDPGR 6.0892 5.2500 7.1300 0.6656 
UNEMP 2.2258 2.0000 2.4000 0.1502 
NETITA 1.2108 0.0428 5.9518 0.7823 
TCETA 12.9264 1.0100 79.9700 10.5927 
NOFFBSTA 0.7414 -0.7849 4.6623 0.6604 
LADEP 38.6505 7.8600 398.5800 31.8008 
LODEP 99.2318 23.5100 351.8700 42.2610 
CDTF 65.2606 15.6300 100.0000 16.3748 
xeff 0.8453 0.4481 0.9950 0.1462 
xeffEQ 0.7346 0.3741 0.9639 0.1423 
xeffRIL 0.7075 0.3821 0.9584 0.1438 
     
Where: LLPTA denotes (Loan Loss Provisions / Total Assets) × 100; GDPGR, GDP growth; UNEMP, 
unemployment rate, NETITA, (Net Income / Total Assets) × 100; TCEQTA, (Total Common Equity / Total 
Assets) × 100; NOFFBSTA, Net Off-Balance Sheet Income / Total Assets) × 100; LADEP, (Liquid Assets / 
Total Deposits) × 100; LODEP, (Total Loans / Total Deposits) × 100; CDTF, (Customer Deposits / Total 
Funding) × 100; xeff are efficiency scores without risk variables; and xeffRIL and xeffEQ are efficiency scores 
from the distance function including Reserves for Impaired Loans and Equity as risk management control 
variables, respectively. 
 
One of our extensions to the literature is to test the hypotheses that either three different 
specifications of efficiency 𝑥𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 have an effect on managerial behavior in relation to LLP 
(see Boutin-Dufresne et al, 2013).  To estimate the X-efficiencies of Vietnamese banks we 
utilise the stochastic parametric distance function approach (Rezitis, 2008; and Sturm and 
Williams, 2008).  The input-oriented distance function can be interpreted as the greatest 
radial contraction of the input vector, with the output vector held fixed, such that the input 
vector still remains in the input requirement set 𝑉(𝑦):  
    𝐷𝐼(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑝: (𝑥/𝜌) ∈ 𝑉(𝑦)}    (1) 
where the distance function 𝐷𝐼(𝑥, 𝑦) will take a value which is greater than or equal to unity 
if the input vector (𝑥) is an element of the feasible input set and will take a value of unity if 𝑥 
is located on the inner boundary of the input requirement set.  The ‘Base’ stochastic frontier 
model can be specified as follows:  











𝑖=1   
+1
2








𝑚=1 .  (2) 
The normal homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are imposed following the re-
parameterisation of the distance function, following Drake and Simper (2003).  With respect 
to the inputs and outputs used in the estimation of the distance function, we follow the 
traditional intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977); for recent examples see 
Beccalli and Frantz (2009), Fukuyama and Weber (2009) and Wheelock and Wilson (2012).  
A rationale for following the intermediation approach for Vietnamese banking lies in their 
legal definition in which a ‘Bank means a type of credit institution which may conduct all 
banking operations’ including ‘deposit taking’, ‘credit extension’ and ‘provision of services 
of via-account payment’ (Law on Credit Institution, 47/2010/QH12).  Given this definition 
we use three inputs: total interest expense, personnel expenses and other operating expenses 
and three outputs, customer loans, interbank business loans, and off-balance-sheet & total 
securities business - following Shin (2009) and Bushman and Williams (2012). 
We also include linear (𝑇) and quadratic (𝑇2) time trends to account for systemic 
changes in bank optimisation based on technical change (Goddard et al, 2014).  In addition to 
the Base model we also estimate a further two distance functions that include either Reserves 
for Impaired Loans (Model 2) or Equity (Model 3) which account for the risk management of 
Vietnamese banks.  These determine whether our Base model and hence GMM specification 
is robust to the exclusion/inclusion of these risk management variables which have been 
found to have an influence on bank efficiency scores in the literature, however, as yet there is 
no agreement on which is most suitable. 
Finally, as we wish to use the results from the efficiencies obtained from the distance 
function in a regression on loan loss provisions, it is necessary to ensure the technical 
efficiencies are a gross measure.  That is, we want the efficiencies to be weakly exogenous 
(or predetermined) to LLP, hence allowing us to directly test whether LLP has a counter/pro-
cyclical nature and if X-efficiencies have a direct effect on LLP over the business cycle.  This 
is undertaken, by estimating the Battese and Coelli (1995) technical efficiency effects model 
in which we allow for the impact of 𝑍𝑖𝑡  bank specific and macroeconomic variables by 
entering the efficiency term 𝜇𝑖𝑡 , where 𝜇𝑖𝑡~𝑁(𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝜎𝜇𝑖𝑡
2 ), 𝑚𝑖𝑡  takes the linear form 𝑚𝑖𝑡 =
𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡, with 𝑍𝑖𝑡 a (𝑝 × 1) vector of variables which may influence the efficiencies, 𝛿𝑖  is 
an (1 × 𝑝) vector of parameters to be estimated and 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is a random variable 𝜔𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜔𝑖𝑡
2 ), 
see Coelli et al. (1999).  . The 𝑍𝑖𝑡′𝑠 include a dummies for listed, a controlled subsidiary and 
independent banks, number of ATM’s per 100,000 adults (ATMs), domestic credit to the 
private sector by banks as % GDP (CREDIT), broad money growth (M2GR), and the risk 
premium on lending (RPREM). 
Table 2.  Distance Function - Summary Statistics 
 Mean Minimum Maximum St. Dev. 
Y1: Gross Loans 28258.63 204.85 277450.39 47490.13 
Y2: Loans and Advances to Banks 8742.39 30.11 54089.81 10755.13 
Y3: Off-Balance-Sheet Assets 16521.99 41.10 84162.60 19390.20 
X1: Interest Expenses 2950.57 12.39 26011.09 4307.30 
X2: Personnel Expenses 425.22 5.57 5301.83 819.71 
X3: Other Operating Expenses 393.57 10.55 3355.97 595.08 
NX2 Reserves for Impaired Loans 990.06 2643.04 23491.40 0.1523 
NX1: Equity 3728.46 397.52 19366.89 3654.81 
Z1: ATMS  14.53 3.51 21.15 5.49 
Z2: CREDIT 95.13 65.36 114.72 14.23 
Z3: RPREM 4.07 1.99 7.03 1.79 
Z4: M2GR 26.84 11.94 49.11 10.27 
VND billion.  Data deflated by GDP deflator.  Official exchange rate VND 20,509.75 equalled $1 in 2011 
 
4.  Results 
Our methodology employs a linear dynamic panel-data model which includes lags of the 
dependent variable as covariates and contains unobserved panel-level effects, fixed or 
random.  Therefore, the estimator eliminates the unobserved bank specific effects by taking 
the first difference and captures the dynamic nature of the models by allowing the inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable.    
The independent endogenous variable, the x-efficiencies, were instrumentalised and tested for 
endogeneity, where we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for xeff at the 7.12%, xeffRIL 
at the 6.24% and xeffLEQ at the 5.74% critical level.  The x-efficiencies were then 
instrumentalised with the first two lags of their own levels and by ‘net interest revenue/total 
assets’, ‘other operating income/total assets’, ‘net interest income/total assets’ and ‘net 
interest margin’ and assessed using the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test which rejected the 
null hypothesis (F-tests equal to xeff 9.48 (p-value 0.00), xeffRIL 13.32 (p-value 0.00) and 
xeffLEQ 13.77 (p-value 0.00).  Two post estimation tests were also conducted; the Hansen 
test of joint validity of the instruments and the second order serial correlation ‘Arellano – 
Bond’ (See Table 3 below for results). Finally the finite sample correction proposed by 
Windmeijer (2005) was implemented calculating corrected standard errors.  .  
In Table 3 we present estimates for Base, Model 2 and Model 3.  We find by 
observing the signs of the macro variable coefficients that there is an insignificant 
relationship with GDPG (GDP growth) – thus indicating no counter/pro-cyclical provisioning 
behaviour, agreeing with Eng and Nabar (2007) for Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.  
That is, our result is different to the positive relationship between GDPG and LLP found by 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), Fonseca and González (2008), Ghosh (2007); Leventis et al 
(2012) and Wong et al. (2011). This  result corresponds favourably with Vietnam 
implementing IAS 39, implying that objective evidence is required on loan impairments 
before loan loss provisions can be made, hence restricting the buffering across the economic 
cycle and exacerbating pro-cyclical LLP.  In respect of the other macro-environment variable 
– the unemployment rate UNEMPt - it is found to be insignificantly correlated with LLP, see 
also Bikker and Metzemakers (2005).  A possible explanation is that the unemployment rate 
does not act as a proxy for loan demand (Beatty and Liao, 2011), that is, a higher 
unemployment rate will not cause lower loan growth, as there’s less demand bank loans. 
The income-smoothing hypothesis concerns the relationship between net income 
NETITAit  and LLP, where we find a significant negative relationship, as also found by 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and contrary to Packer and Zhu, 2012; Ghosh, 2007.  Indeed, 
Leventis et al. (2011) argue that a negative relationship denotes more riskier banks whereby 
managers have more discretion over earnings and therefore do not buffer against the 
economic cycle as witnessed in Vietnam.  That is, the general provisioning of banks does not 
explain fluctuations in Vietnamese LLP and its procyclical relationship with GDP.   
 
Table 3.  Tests of Loan Loss Provisioning Hypotheses 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, where ** denotes significance at the 5% and * at the 10% critical 
levels respectively.  The null hypothesis for the Arellano-Bond test is no first and/or second order 
autocorrelation, p-values are presented.  xeff are X-efficiency scores from the distance function excluding the 
risk management control variable, xeffRIL using Reserves for Impaired Loans and xeffEQ using Equity 
respectively. In our case, all models reject the LR test of a one-sided error null hypothesis and also reject the 
hypotheses that   or 1 at the 5 or 10% critical levels (where γ=0.6274 in Base Model 1, γ=0.7536 in Model 2 and 
γ=0.7080 for Model 3).  This indicates that input-orientated technical efficiency is important in explaining the 
total variability of inputs in Vietnamese banks. 
 
With respect to the capital management hypothesis, TCEQTAit is insignificant in the Base 
model showing that Vietnamese banks with low capital who utilise LLP do not boost their 
Coefficient 
 
Base Model Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 
 
-0.4930     (1.2721) -0.1299     (1.4244) -0.5152     (1.4157) 
LLPTAt-1 
 
0.7050      (0.6113) 0.8372*    (0.4808) 0.9716*    (0.5677) 
Xeff 
 
1.0165**  (0.4735)   
xeffRIL 
 
 1.0060*    (0.5511)  
xeffEQ    1.0983**  (0.5694) 
GDPG  0.0945      (0.0973) 0.1182     (0.1201) 0.0974     (0.1216) 
UNEMP 
 
-0.4924     (0.4881) -0.5376    (0.4678) -0.3185    (0.4530) 
NETITA 
 
-0.2121*   (0.1262) -0.1965*  (0.1039) -0.2173** (0.0971) 
TCEQTA 
 
0.0204       (0.0141) 0.0238** (0.0105) 0.0277**  (0.0106) 
NOFFBSTA 
 
0.2423       (0.1689) 0.1966     (0.1677) 0.1859     (0.1879) 
LADEP 
 
-0.0218**  (0.0101) -0.0240*  (0.0121) -0.0199*   (0.0123) 
LODEP 
 
0.0093*     (0.0055) 0.0058     (0.0037) 0.0052     (0.0042) 
CDTF 
 
0.0008       (0.0088) 0.0021     (0.0069) -0.0011    (0.0063) 
Wald statistic 𝜒10
2   
 
103.58** 97.47** 79.74** 
Arellano-Bond Order 1 
 
z = -1.83* Pr>z = 0.07 z = -1.97* Pr>z = 0.05 z = -1.84* Pr>z = 0.07 
Arellano-Bond Order 2 
 
z = -0.31  Pr>z = 0.76 z = -0.23 Pr>z = 0.82 z = -0.28  Pr>z = 0.78 
Hansen J-test 𝜒12
2 = 12.64 Pr = 0.44 𝜒12
2 = 12.88 Pr = 0.38 𝜒12
































Tier 2 capital positions.  However, when we include x-efficiency scores that have additional 
risk management variables in the distance function TCEQTAit  becomes significant.  This 
linkage with the capital management hypothesis brings us nicely to the effect of x-
efficiencies on LLP. A brief over-view of the x-efficiency scores in Figure 1 below shows 
that they closely follow the economic cycle that happened pre, during and post GFC where 
the main feedback occurred after 2008. 
Figure 1. Average X-efficiency in the Vietnamese Banking Market 
 
For example, average scores in 2008 equalled 0.9765 (Base model), 0.8265 (Model 2) and 
0.8463 (Model 3) which subsequently dropped dramatically in 2009 to 0.6909, 0.5926 and 
0.4908 and continued with low efficiency scores in 2010 equal to 0.7159, 0.5799 and 0.6044 
respectively. Finally the results show that, on quick analysis of Figure 1, one can conclude 
that the X-efficiencies of Vietnamese banks are potentially model-dependent on whether risk 
management variables are included or excluded. For example, Shinhan Bank Vietnam has a 
x-efficiency scores in 2012 equal to 0.7790 (Base model 1), 0.4814 (Model 2) and 0.532 
(Model 3).  Hence, importantly for the inclusion of x-efficiencies in any secondary stage 
modelling, we purport that there is inter-temporal stability of scores across models, whether 
for the best or worst performing banks (individual efficiency scores available on request).  
This further supports our modelling methodology in so much as any LLP models which 
exclude X-efficiency scorers could bias results – not on an individual bank level but at the 
industry specific analysis, an important finding.   
 In all the system GMM models, the X-efficiencies are found to be positively related to 
LLP and show that as managers reduce forecasting errors (the mis-allocation of resources 
from inputs to outputs) in their business models (thereby increasing X-efficiency), LLP 
increases.  Furthermore, when risk management variables are included (models 2 and 3) 
TEQTA becomes significant, and across all models LADEP is negative and significant, thus 
now accepting the capital management hypothesis.   
With respect to the net off-balance-sheet variableNOFFBSTAit , it is insignificant 
which is the opposite of that found in Kanagaretnam et al. (2003).  Indeed, they argue that the 
relationship between net/gains losses on securities and LLP should be negative for income-
smoothing. Their theory is, however, counter intuitive as we would expect two outcomes, 
either positive and significant or insignificant, as we have found.  That is, as bank managers 
diversify away from traditional loans and mortgages into more off-balance-sheet items, then 
the risk profiles of banks change and potential losses need to be covered through profits and 
retained earnings.  The conservative nature of Vietnamese banks implies that as NOFFBSTAit 
increases they do not need to substitute the use of retained earnings to cover potential bad 
security investments with LLP, thereby smoothing their earnings.  This relationship shows 
how potential losses and the change in banks’ risk profiles are anticipated by banks as they 
move into securities and trading.  Finally, the remaining two variables covering liquidity  
𝐿𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡  and loan portfolio risk 𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 are significant as expected. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown the potential importance of including X-efficiency estimates 
when determining which hypotheses – capital management, counter or pro-cyclical and/or 
income-smoothing – bank managers seem to use to manipulate their bank income statements.  
However, all Models provide strong support for counter-cyclical income smoothing and pro-
cyclical x-efficiency provisioning behaviour.  In addition, pro-cyclical capital management 
behaviour is shown when risk variables are included in the estimation of the X-efficiencies.  
Indeed, as suggested by Hughes and Mester (1993), including equity in the X-efficiency 
estimation could reveal different risk aversion (or appetites) of the banks.  That is, the 
minimum capital-asset ratio set by regulators will restrict the banks from operating at the 
cost-minimizing financial capital level, therefore affecting the efficiency level of the banks.  
Park and Weber (2006) meanwhile argue that given the ability to manipulate inputs and 
outputs, managers will consider the risk-return preferences of bank owners.  As such, there is 
a choice to preserve equity capital by employing labour to monitor risky loans and 
investments, or take greater risk by employing less labour to lower costs and increase X-
efficiency.  Hence, the risk management control variable – equity – must be included to 
capture the management effect and the business model of the banks.  Koutsomanoli-Filippaki 
et al. (2009) also argue that “if financial capital is ignored, the efficiency of banks that may 
be more risk averse than others and may hold a higher level of financial capital would be 
mismeasured, even though they are behaving optimally given their risk preferences” (page 
561).  All these arguments, together with our findings, support the case for including equity 
capital as a risk control variable in the modelling process. 
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